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The preceding articles vividly illustrate the continuing interest 
of political scientists in the ways in which institutions in general 
constrain political behavior and shape political outcomes. With 
respect to Congress in particular, two distinct approaches to the 
study of institutions emerge. Shepsle's pioneering work on 
structure-induced equilibria is theoretical; Fenno's and Polsby's 
research is more directly based on real-world observations of 
Congress, No doubt some readers have a predilection for one approach 
or the other, but regardless of which is favored, differences between 
the observations of the latter and the theory of the former are 
bothersome. For example, Fenno's committees are all different; 
Shepsle's are all the same. Polsby's Congress changes over time; 
Shepsle's abstract institution is static. In the extreme, skepticism 
about Shepsle's theory raises doubts regarding the usefulness of 
•This-paper-Is-being-prepared for a volume of research on Congress, 
edited by Mathew D. Mccubbins and Terry Sullivan. It is to be 
included in a section on institutionalization, which also will include 
reprints of Shepsle (1979) , Polsby (1968 ) , and excerpts from Fenno 
( 1 973 } .  
abstractions such as finite coverings, correspondences and orthogonal 
bases for understanding Congress. 
To demand that Shepsle's theory pertain to all sessions of 
Congress or to all decision-making settings within any given session 
is, of course, unreasonable. But in light of the indisputable 
empirical truths that Congress does change and congressional 
committees do differ, a more modest request is appropriate, namely, a 
request for a demonstration of the empirical relevance of formal 
theories of institutions, 
This article addresses the somewhat narrower topic of whether a 
theory of legislatures, §. !.9. Shepsle, can usefully and intelligibly 
accomodate the diversity in real-world legislatures, and whether in 
doing so it can retain its ability to predict political outcomes. I 
argue that Shepsle's theory is indeed useful for understanding 
Congress, in spite of its various limitations and simplifications, 
some of which are defended and others of which are corrected, 
Ultimately, I show how a proposed theoretical extension, while 
abstract, nevertheless says something concrete about how the 
institutionalization in Congress can stabilize congressional outcomes. 
The essay begins with a nontechnical review of Shepsle's theory and 
its main result, and proceeds to extend the theory to situations in 
which committees are more attentive and responsive to the preferences 
of noncommittee members. New theoretical results are presented for 
"simple institutional arrangements" (SIAs} with sophisticated 
committees, and Fenno's House committees and Polsby's comments on 
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institutionalization are reconsidered in light of the revised theory. 
I. Ingredients 
An implicit assumption in Sheple's theory is that political 
outcomes (congressional decisions, for example) result from three 
types of ingredients: the Qrgfgrgngg§ of decision-makers for various 
policies, the !nst!tut!Qng! fggtyrg§ that specify when, how, and by 
whom decisions are made, and the §trgtgg!g§ decision-makers employ 
within the confines of institutional features in their attempts to 
obtain preferred outcomes. Shepsle's main theoretical result is that 
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the imposition of institutional features -- most notably the committee 
system and jurisdictional system � says a lot about what policies are 
selected. Specifically, these institutional ("structural") features 
create ("induce") a predictable and stable outcome ("equilibrium") in 
a large class of situations in which their absence would guarantee 
virtually complete unpredictability and instability of outcomes. 
Since the theory places few constraints on the configurations of 
decision-makers' preferences, institutional features are properly 
credited for inducing equilibria, Thus to the degree that the 
assumptions of the theory are defensible, the importance of 
institutional features cannot be doubted. 
Of course, neither Fenno nor Polsby doubt the importance of 
institutional features. Polsby, for example, writes that 
[i]t is hard � indeed for the contemporary observer, impossible 
-- to shake the conviction that the House's institutional 
structure does matter greatly in the production of political 
outcomes (p. 1 6 5) , 
This is not to say, however, that observers of Congress are at ease 
with Shepsle's theoretical characterization of preferences, 
institutions and strategies. We therefore raise the question: How 
closely does Shepsle's institutional arrangement resemble the U.S. 
Congress? For an answer we examine the theory in light of Congress 
itself. Unlike Shepsle who demands a high level of generality from 
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his theoretical results, we introduce the ingredients of the theory at 
a relatively specific, concrete, and nontechnical level. First we 
examine the assumptions about preferences, second institutional 
features, and finally (in a later section) strategies, Only in the 
latter case do my assumptions differ significantly from Shepsle's. 
frefgrgngg§. The initial assumption is that a legislature 
consists of a set of members who make decisions about different 
policies. Specific policies are represented as points in a geometric 
space; areas of policy (issues) are represented as different 
dimensions (axes) in the space. Figure la is a simple two-dimensional 
example in which the only policies on which this legislature makes 
decisions are domestic spending and military spending. Domestic 
spending is represented by the horizontal axis; military sp�nding is 
represented by the vertical axis. Any point on an axis represents a 
policy, that is, a decision to spend the amount specified by the 
numerical value of the point. Selection of an overall spending policy 
consists of selecting a point in this two-dimensional space, The 
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point A ,  for example, represents domestic expenditures of $400 billion 
and military expenditures of $350 billion. 
[figure 1) 
Different members typically want different policies, Similarly, 
any individual member prefers some policies to others, We assume that 
there is a minimal degree of consistency in each individual's 
preferences, Consistency of preferences can be expressed in a number 
of ways, one of the simplest of which is the notion of single-
peakedness. Consider the preferences of a single legislator on 
domestic spending. Suppose that the level of domestic spending he 
prefers most is $300 billion. If, as in figure lb, we again represent 
domestic spending on the horizontal axis, but now let the vertical 
axis reflect the degree to which the member likes (or values) various 
policies on the horizontal axis, we can straightforwardly plot the 
legislator's preference curve for domestic spending. Notice that the 
solid curve reaches its sole maximum directly above the $300 billion 
point on the policy axis, Thus the point x• at $300 billion on the 
horizontal axis is the legislator's ideal point. Furthermore, the 
degree to which the legislator values other policies never increases 
as alternatives get farther and farther from his ideal point. 
What if preference curves were not single-peaked? The dotted 
curve in figure lb, means that even though spending, say, $350 billion 
is preferred by the legislator to spending $400 billion (consistent 
with single-peakedness up to this point) , the member nevertheless 
prefers spending $500 billion to $400 billion. Clearly, this violates 
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intui tive notions about consistency. As other research in this volume 
persuasively suggests , legislators aggressively seek their jobs and 
are increasingly preocc upied wi th keeping them (see , for example ,  
Pol sby , p.  166) , I t  there fore seems reasonable to ass ume that such 
inexplicable pre ferences are no t common among congressmen . Thus ,  to 
rei terate ,  every legislator has an ideal point in the policy space. 
Moreover , a legislator 's pre ference for a policy always declines as 
the distance between the policy and his ideal point increases. 
The theoretical significance of the ass umption is ill us trated in 
fig ure 2, which shows five members who have single-peaked pre ferences
• • 
and ideal points x1, •• • , x 5• The fig ure also shows a sta tus q uo 
point, s0 , which represents existing policy , and a proposal or bill , 
B, which represents an attempt to change s0 • ( Only later are we 
concerned with the origin o f  B.) 
[figure 2) 
S uppose that whenever a member has a chance to vote for one o f  
two al terna tives h e  votes for the al ternative he prefers,  tha t  i s ,  the 
one that projects upward to a higher point on his single-peaked 
pre ference c urve. Then, under commonly used amendment processe s ,  
something predic table happens. In a vote tha t  pairs S against B, B 
obtains the votes of members 3 , 4, and 5 and wins. S uppose , however , 
tha t  B can be amended. Members 1 and 2 see that C is pre ferable not
only for themselves but also for member 3 ,  so they propose i t  as an 
amendment, where upon members 1 ,  2, and 3 vo te to accept i t. Next
members 4 and 5 might coun terpropose D, which wi th member 3 's vo te 
so 
x *  1 
Fi gure 2 
Example of a Median Vo te r Outcome 
x*  2 
c D B 
x *  4 x* 5 
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d efeats C .  This process might continue, b ut b y  now th e dynamic, i f  
no t the o utcome, i s  cl ear . Eventually m ember 3 's ideal point i ts el f 
will b e  offer ed and s el ec ted as an am endment, after which no point 
will d efea t i t, 
Th e g eneral statem en t o f  this phenomenon is Black's median voter 
theor em1 -- so call ed b ecause i t  says that wi th m embers arrayed on a 
policy dimension in such a way tha t  their pr efer enc es ar e singl e­
p eaked ,  and with an open am endmen t  process such as th e one j us t  
d escribed ,  the o utcom e is always the ideal point o f  th e m edian voter 
� the vo ter for whom hal f o f  the o th er vo ters ' i d eal points are on 
ei th er side of his . S urprisingly, this rath er simp l e  res ul t  is 
ins tr um en tal for many of th e mor e complica ted , insti tutionally rich 
res ul ts i n  Shepsl e's ar ticl e. 
Ins ti tutional features . The nature o f  l egisla tors' pr efer enc es 
over al terna tiv es in a policy spac e is one o f  th e most basic 
ingredien ts of poli tical d ecision-making and, not coincid en tally, th e 
one on which most formal poli tical theory foc us ed prior to Shepsl e. 
We know, howev er ,  tha t  th er e is mor e structur e  to congressional 
d ecision-making than pr efer enc es alone r efl ec t. Fenno 's and Polsby's 
res earch provide d etails of s ev eral "str uc tur ers". The committee 
sys tem divides labor by assigning di ffer en t members to di ffer ent 
commi ttees . The j urisdictional system ensures that di ffer en t 
commi ttees work on di ffer en t probl ems and d ecid e on differ en t 
polici es .  Thus,  ac tual d ecision-making i n  Congress i s  a t  l east a 
two-stage proc ess : committee members (a s ubset o f  th e full m embershi p )  
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d ecid e first; th e full membership th en acc epts ,  r ej ec ts ,  or � 
d ep ending on th e r ul es -- am ends the d ecision o f  a commi ttee. Among 
o th er things,  the r ul es determine the circumstanc es und er which
m embers may or may no t o ffer amendmen ts to commi ttees ' l egislation .  
Shepsle shows that insti tutional fea tures , too ,  can b e  expr essed 
formally . To bring the disc ussion clos er to Congr ess w e  provide some 
exampl es .  
A commi ttee is a s ubs et o f  l egislators ;  the committee system is 
the m echanism that divid es th e full m embership into s ubgroups . For 
example, th e commi ttee system assigns Jim Jones, Jim Wright, Jack 
K emp, ••• to th e B udget Commi ttee; Jami e Whi tten, Silvio Conte, David 
Obey,  ••• to th e Appropriations Commi ttee; John Dingell,  James 
Broyhill ,  H enry Waxman, ••• to th e Committee on Energy and Commer c e, 
and so on . 
Th e j urisdic tional system is str ucturally similar to th e 
committee system, but assigns policy dimensions, instead o f  
l egislators ,  to commi ttees . Tax policy is assigned to th e Ways and 
M eans Commi ttee, ther eby granting Ways and Means the excl usiv e 
privileg e  of making ini tial proposals ( bills) on tax policy . 
Similarly, ed ucation policy and labor policy are matters tak en up by 
th e Education and Labor Commi ttee; d efense policy is the j urisdic tion 
of th e A rmed S ervices Commi ttee, etc . 
This charac terization o f  commi ttee and j urisdictional systems is 
r emarkably fl exibl e. Nothing formally prohibi ts a l egisla tor from 
s erving on mor e than one committee. Indeed, almos t all congr essmen 
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serve on two or more committees . A dimension o f  the policy space may 
be assigned to more than one committee , also . For example , the 
Science and Technology Commi ttee in the House has j urisdic tion over 
some matters of education -- such as a uthorizations for the National 
Science Fo undation which funds several science education programs 
even though the Ed ucation and Labor Committee , claims the same 
j urisdiction ( wi th mixed success ) .  
Complicated j urisdictional arrangements confo und not only the 
e fforts o f  members o f  Congress to pass legislation, but also the 
attempts o f  political scientists to predict congressional o utcome s .  
Therefore , i t  i s  understandable tha t  while present theore tical tools 
enable us to de fine complex combinations of commi ttee and 
j urisdictional systems, present theore tical resul ts rest on 
assumptions o f  simpler insti tutional arrangements . In particular, we 
assume tha t  a special , restricted combination o f  commi ttee and 
j urisdictional systems is in e ffec t, called a §iffiQlg in§1i1Y1iQDs1 
srrgnggrngn1. abbrevia ted S IA .
To understand precisely wha t an S IA is, recall that the policy 
space is n-dimensional . Al though figure la shows only two broadly 
de fined dimensions , the congressional policy space is be tter 
represented as several narrower one s .  For example ,  to tal domestic 
spending is an amalgam of spending decisions by several committees : 
the Judiciary Commi ttee makes initial decisions on a uthorizations for 
the Justice Department, the Energy and Commerce Committee makes 
ini tial decisions on toxic waste clean-up ,  and so on , The ass umption 
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o f  S IAs pertains to the relationship be tween, and the numbers o f, 
commi ttees and j urisdictions . Speci fically , an i nsti tutional 
arrangement is considered simple i f  each commi ttee has one and only 
one uniq ue unidimensional j urisdiction, Thus committees do not share 
j urisdictions , and no commi ttee 's j urisdiction contains more than one 
policy dimension . This implies a one-to-one-to-one relationship 
be tween committees , jurisdic tions and policy dimensions, Simple 
insti tutional arrangements , there fore , are Yfil::l simple -- so simple , 
in fact, tha t  one may argue tha t  they bear li ttle resembl ance to 
Congress . Congres s ,  unlike S IAs, has some mul tidimensional and 
overlapping j urisdic tions, and some recent re forms have made them more 
common . Nevertheless , there are several reasons for focusing on S IAs . 
First, all models are simplifications . If a model abstracts 
essential features from a real world si tua tion, then simplici ty is no 
de triment. 2 To speci fy the essential features entails j udgment, o f
course . But inasmuch as few congressional scholars wo uld omit the 
commi ttee and j urisdictional systems from their list of essential 
fea tures,  we may rest assured that we are o ff to a good start. 
Second , closer consideration of behavioral as well as str uctural 
fea tures of Congress suggests tha t  the ass umption of unidimensional 
and nonoverlapping j urisdic tions is no t so unrealistic a fter all . 
Even tho ugh j urisdic tions o f  speci fic committees may no t be 
unidimensional in the sense that the Education and Labor Committee , 
for example ,  wri tes legislation both on education and labor policy, 
there is a tendency for committees to address one policy at a time . 
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The existence o f  mul tidimensional jurisdictions , then ,  does not imply 
that commi ttees with such jurisdictions produce mul tidimensional 
legislation. 
Third , even i f  policies within broad areas such as education, 
labor , energy, and transporta tion are technically multidimensiona l ,  
legislators o ften evaluate policies a s  i f  they were unidimensional . 
For example , during the 2nd session o f  the 98 th Congress, the Mari time 
Authoriza tion Bill ( HR 5723 ) contained speci fic provisions for 
construction subsidies, loan guarantees , and development funds (all 
for American shipbuilders) , as well as restrictions on foreign flag 
vessels, Theoretically, each provision might be considered a separate 
dimension : the amount of construc tion subsidie s ,  the degree to which 
loans are guaranteed , etc. In practice , however ,  most members 
probably evaluated the legislation more parsimoniously; their main 
interest was in how much the provisions as a whole helped American 
shipbuilders, Ther e fore , the situation approximates a unidimensional 
one , even though a strict interpre ta tion casts it in a 
multidimensional framework .3 
Legislators may also address relatively complex and possibly 
multidimensional legislation by ignoring all but one ma jor dimension. 
Legislation is o ften noncontroversial on all bu t a single point, so 
the array o f  pre ferences on the single controversial dimension is all 
that matters in practice , An example of this process is the House 
Judiciary Committe e 's treatment o f  the Senate 's authorization bill for 
the Justice Department ( S  951 ) .  The bill contai ned many provisions, 
12 
but only one aroused much attention, namely, a provision that would 
have ended court-ordered busing for the purpose of achieving racial 
balance in schools. Thus, as with the ship-building example , the way 
in which legislators are likely to perceive bills o ften makes a 
putatively mul tidimensional decision unidimensional in pra c tice . 
In sum, while nei ther Shepsle nor I would argue tha t  gll 
congressional commi ttee and jurisdictional arrangements fall into the 
class o f  SIAs,  a su fficient number do so that we may proceed 
comfortably with the assumption. 
Thus far we have seen how the commi ttee and jurisdi c tional 
systems de termine the assignment of members and policies to 
commi ttees , thereby imposing some order on congressional decision­
making . Li ttle has been said ,  however , about how members may ( and may 
not) behave in the se minimally structured se ttings, Wha t 
insti tutional fea tures comparably struc ture strategies -- the 
expression o f  pre ferences -- as commi ttee and jurisdictional systems 
struc ture the opportuni ties for members to make ini tial choices about 
policy? One answer is the rules, In two-stage decision-making , rules 
shape strategies by de fining the se t of al ternative proposals that 
members in the second, floor stage may o ffer to the bill produced by 
commi ttee in the first stage . Shepsle discusses several kinds o f  
"amendment control rules , "  three o f  which are most prevalent i n  
Congress : ope n ,  germaneness, and closed. The meaning of each becomes 
clear in the context of the policy space . 
The open rule is the least constrai ning rule. In a 
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mul tidimensional policy space, it permits any amendmen t. Th us when i t  
i s  i n  e ffec t, as i s  normal in the Senate, amendments may be o ffered by 
any member on the floor who is recognized by the chair . Moreover, the 
amendment need no t pertain to the legisla tion under consideration .  An 
amendment to a jobs bill,  for example ,  might call for the repeal of 
withholding o f  taxes on interest and dividends . 4 
The germaneness r ule also permits amendments, but i t  requires 
that they pertain closely to the issue under consideration. In SIAs,  
the germaneness r ule allows any amendment tha t  l eaves policy unchanged 
on all dimensions other than the one c urrently under consideration . 
I f, for example , the Ho use is operating under the germaness r ul e  (as 
i t  normally does)  and is debating a bill for appropriations for 
military assistance to El Salvador, members are permi tted to propose 
amendmen ts changing the level of assistance to El Salvador . To 
propose an amendment to red uce subsidies to tobacco farmers in North 
Carolina, however , would be nongermane and in viola tion o f  the r ule . 
The germaneness r ule,  then, provides some opportun i ties for 
noncommi ttee members to shape legislation, but constrains their 
e ffor ts to the issue at hand . 
No s uch oppor tunities are available under the closed r ule,  which 
dicta tes that members on the floor simply accept or rej ect the 
commi ttee bil l .  S trategic oppor tuni ties for noncommi ttee members, 
therefore , are minimal . In  contrast, s trategic oppor tuni ties for the 
commi ttee that reports the bill are sometimes s ubs tantial . 
The continuum that emerges from the disc ussion of rules is the 
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degree of openness of the r ule . As r ules change from closed to 
germaneness to open, more amendmen ts are permitted ,  and the 
requirement tha t  the policy content of the amendments per tain closely 
to the legislation is relaxed . A l though the r ules represent only 
three points on the continuum, ( and we foc us on only two below ) , the 
continuum re flects o ther, relatively complicated congressional r ules . 
Scholars who observe congressional r ules first-hand and wri te about 
them more concre tely, classi fy the r ules in a manner consistent wi th 
the continuum .  For example, in a series o f  s tudies o f  "complex r ules " 
in the House, S tanley Bach disc usses r ules as being ei ther "expansive" 
or "restrictiv e ". The degree of expansiveness or restric tiveness is 
consistent with movement towards the open or closed end o f  the 
continuum . 5 
II.  S tr uc ture-Ind uced Equilibria 
Having reintroduced the principal ingredients in Shepsle's 
theory, we next reconsider i ts main result -- the existence o f  
s tr uc ture-induced equilibria . O ur demonstrations and disc ussion are 
designed to answer several q uestions . First, exactly how do the 
insti tutional fea tures, s uch as commi ttee system, j urisdic tional 
system and r ules, channel o utcomes to speci fic points or regions in 
the policy space? Second , what does it mean for an o utcome to be an 
equilibrium? And finally, how credible is the resul t  in light of 
what Fenno, Polsby, and o thers wri te about Congress? 
Outcomes under the germaneness r ule, In figure 3a, x 's represent 
1 5  
ideal points of commi ttee members and o's represent ideal points of 
legislators who par ticipate in decisi on-making only on the fl oor. 6 CM 
represents the ideal point of the commi ttee median voter, FM is the 
ideal point of the fl oor median v oter ,  s0 is the s ta tus q uo point at
the ini tial time period ,  and B is the bill repor ted to the fl oor by 
the commi ttee . 
[figure 3 ]  
According to Shepsle's ass umptions, decision-making proceeds as 
follows . First the committee c onvenes and decides to report i ts 
median prop osal to the fl oor , th us the bill is l ocated a t  CM . This is 
a straigh tforward applicati on of Black's the orem wi thin commi ttee, 
Once sent to the fl oor, the bill is s ubj ect to amendmen t under the 
germenaness r ul e ,  so fl oor members may propose any amendment that 
changes policy on only this dimensi on, Again,  Black's the orem 
generates the predic ti on:  the amendment process c on tinues un til a 
maj ori ty votes in fav or of the fl oor median prop osal (FM ) , after which 
no proposal de fea ts i t. The outc ome, there fore,  is FM, which in turn 
bec omes S ,  the .llilli. status q uo point. 
The occurrence of s uch an outc ome under the germaneness r ule is 
straightforward . That the outc ome is an eq uilibri um is somewhat m ore 
complicated . We there fore examine in some d e tail what i t  means for an 
outcome to be in equilibrium .  This entails c ons ul ting, backtr acking, 
and sometimes negating Shepsle's key defini ti ons in order to devise a 
generally applicable test for si tuati ons ,  s uch as figure 3 ,  in which 
we want to know whe ther an outcome, S, a fter some prior sessi on of 
Figure .3 
Committee Bills and Floor Outcomes 
in Shepsle's Institutional Arrangements 
a. Germaneness Rule 
Bill - - - - - - - )Outcome 
l --x--x-x-----�---0-0--0-0-
CM so 
A 
b. Closed Rule 
Bi 11 Outcome 
l --x--x-x------( 0--0-)-0--0-
CM 
A 
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d ecision-making is a structure-induced equilibrium . Shepsle states 
that 
Definition 1 .  "Th e  status quo • • •  is a §1£YQ1Yrg-ind yggg 
§�Y111Qr1YID [SIE ] if and only if it is invulnerable" ( p .  3 6) . 
Working backward and paraphrasing, we find that 
Definition 2 .  The status quo is YY1ngfgQ1§ (and hence not an 
SIE )  if either condition R or RA, d efined as follows, is 
satisfied : 
R :  there exists a f§Q1sQ§mgn1, that is, a point that 
( 1 )  is in the jurisdiction of the committ ee, 
( 2 )  the committee chooses over the status quo , 
( 3 )  the house chooses over all valid amendments and over 
the status quo . 
RA : there exists a f§Q!gcemgnt QY gmgngmgn1, that is, a point 
that 
( 1 ) is in the jurisdiction of the committ ee, 
( 2 ) the commit t ee chooses over the status quo , 
( 4) has a valid amendment that the house chooses over the 
point and over th e status quo . 
Conversely , we can say 
Definition 3 ,  The status quo is inyulnerg Q!§ (and hence an SIE ) 
if neither R nor RA is satisfied ,  that is, if 
-R : there is no f§Q1gggmgn1, that is, no point such that ( 1 )  
and ( 2 )  and ( 3 )  above are each satisfied, 
and 
-RA : there is DQ f§Q1gggmgn1 QY gmgngmgnt, that is, no point 
such that ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  and (4) above are each satisfied . 7 
Notice how th e symbols simplify matters . Because conditions ( 1 )  
and ( 2 )  are id entical under replacement ( R ) , replacement by am endment 
( RA) , no replacement ( -R )  and no replacement by am endment (-RA ) , we 
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use the same label s .  But notice also the differences b etw een 
r eplacem ent and replacement by am endment (and their negations ) due to 
conditions ( 3 )  and (4) . A replacement is a point that d efeats all 
competitors; a replacement by am endment is a point chosen by a 
commit t ee for which there is an amendable version that d efeats both 
the original point ( the bil l )  and the status quo .8 
With ref er ence to these d efinitions, exist ence and nonexist ence 
of SIE in various settings is easily d emonstrated .  Shepsle rigorously 
proves the exist ence of SIE in settings such as figure 3 ,  so we cannot 
doubt exist ence in these situations . Neverthel ess it is a useful 
exercise to focus on the d efinition of invulnerability to see HhY S 
cannot be r eplac ed � neith er directly nor by am endment . 
Cl early, there are points in the jurisdiction of the committee, 
and there are points that a majority on the commit t ee prefers and 
would choose over the status quo . Any point to the l eft of S ( r egion 
A) is preferable to the commit t ee b ecause CM, and ther efore a 
commit t ee majority, is to the l eft of s. Since conditions ( 1 )  and ( 2) 
are satisfied ,  we must contradict both ( 3 )  and ( 4) to d emonstrate 
invulnerability of s. Conditions ( 3 )  and (4) both requir e  that the
floor choose the replacem ent (or an am end ed version ther eof) over the 
status quo . But recall that the new status quo lies precisely at the 
floor median po sitio n .  Black's theorem tells u s  that D Q  point can 
d efeat th e median vot er's ideal point , so S = FM cannot b e  replaced ,  
neither by a committ ee's bill nor by some amendment t o  th e committ ee's 
bil l .  This indeed contradicts conditions ( 3 )  and (4) and d emonstrat es 
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that there is no replacement ,  and no replacement by amendment , for s. 
There fore S is invulnerable and , according to definition 1 ,  an SIE . 
The implication o f  this finding for the larger legislature is 
that attempts to upset this S, or any other S in any other 
jurisdiction, will always fail if the speci fied institutional 
arrangement is in e ffect , if the configuration of pre ferences does not 
change, and i f  members continue to exercise the strategies implicit in 
the theory. The key is that the combination of committee and 
jurisdictional systems structures the legislature in such a way that 
the same process o f  decision-making goes on independently in several 
committees and jurisdictions. Therefore , not only is the S on this 
dimension invulnerable;  all S's in jurisdictions governed by the 
germaneness rule are in equilibrium -- but importantly, equilibrium 
induced by a special combination o f  structural features : the committee 
system, the jurisdictional system, and the germaneness rule.  
Qut QQfilg§ Unggr 1hg Q!Q§gg fly!g. Careful readers will have 
noticed some potentially important qualifications in the previous 
argument , one of which is the restricted focus on the germaneness 
rule , Indeed, Shepsle's main theorems about SIE pertain only to 
situations in which the germaneness rule is in e ffect.  Are 
structure-induced equilibria guaranteed to exist in closed rule 
settings also ? Figure 3b and our restatement of Shepsle's de finitions 
provide the answer. The configuration o f  pre ferences is identical to 
that in figure 3 a ,  but the initial status quo point , s0, is di fferent . 
As be fore , the assumptions dictate that the bill is at the committee 
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median position. But now members cannot amend i t ,  I n  an up-or-down 
vote on the bil l ,  everyone to the right of FM as well as the floor 
median voter himse l f  votes "nay" and the bill is de feated , The 
outcome and new status quo point is there fore the same as the initial 
status quo point . On the grounds that s0 and S are the same , may we 
infer that this S ,  too , is an SIE ? Not until we apply the test.  
Returning to definition 2 ( vulnerability) , we first search for a 
replacement. If we find one , then S is vulnerable and cannot be an 
SIE . Here too there are points in the jurisdiction o f  the committee 
that the committee would choose over the status quo . Any point on the 
line except for S i tsel f is a valid committee proposal ,9 so condition
( 1 )  is satisfied, Condi tion (2) is satisfied also; all points in
region A would be chosen by the committee over s. Next, condition ( 3 )
requires that some point that satisfies ( 1 )  and (2) defeat all
possible amendments and the status quo point . Since there can be no 
amendments under the closed rule, the first part o f  ( 3 )  is trivially 
satis fied. Furthermore , with respect to the second part of ( 3 ) , 
several points can d e feat the status quo . One obvious candidate whose 
attractiveness was demonstrated in the discussion of the germaneness 
rule is FM, which indeed would de feat S on the floor . Therefore we 
have found a replacement and shown S to be vulnerable and there fore 
not an SIE. lO 
The seemingly limited scope o f  struc ture-induced equilibria to 
germaneness situations suggests at least one o f  two things, both of 
which turn out to be closely related to institutionalization and the 
s tabil ity of congressional ou tcom es. First, p erhaps clos ed rul e 
situations are fundamen tally l ess pr edic tabl e and s tabl e  than 
germaneness rul e situations .  T h e  exis tence o f  SIE under the l atter 
bu t not th e form er supports this conjecture, Al terna tively ( bu t  no t 
nec essarily contrastingly) , perhaps th e assumptions of th e theory 
about l eg islators' behavior ar e not plausibl e in l ight of what Fenno 
and o th ers write abou t congressmen. We address assump tions abou t 
strategy next, af ter which w e  ar e better equipped to r econsid er 
ins titu tional iza tion and stabil ity of ou tcomes .  
I I I .  Sophistication in Committees1 1
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A p erpl exing f ea ture in th e situa tions in figure 3 is th e myopic 
behavior of th e committees, Why would exp erienc ed and knowl edg eabl e 
committees ac t as th es e committees ac ted? In figur e 3a,  th e committee 
repor ted a bill consistent w ith its m embers' pr ef er ences ,  bu t 
substantially d iffer en t  from what members on th e floor wanted. 
Thereafter ,  th e bill was am ended substantially, much to th e chagrin of 
th e committee, With a simil ar lack of for esight, th e committee in 
figur e 3b r epor ted a bill d es tined to fail, when, a t  minimum, it could 
have repor ted a bill equal to FM and obtained an ou tcome pr ef erabl e to 
all committee m embers � ind eed preferabl e to a majority of m embers of 
th e l eg islature, too . The ques tion, then, is wh ether d ecision-makers 
in the first ( committee) s tag e of a two-stag e d ecis ion-making process 
take into accoun t probabl e s econd-stag e ac tions . Fiorina and Plott 
21 
, , • [N ] a turally occurring pol itical committees do no t exis t in 
spl endid isolation. Ins tead, they ar e frequently embedd ed in 
some l arger ongo ing ins titu tional context, This embedd ing rais es 
th e following po tentially critical ques tion: if th e committee 
d ecision is regard ed by th e m embers as only one s tag e in a 
sequence of gam es ,  might behavior in the committee r efl ec t 
strategic considerations from the larger game? If so , a mod el 
which explains th e behavior in th e larger game migh t produc e  
implica tions for th e committee stage which d iffer subs tantially 
from thos e impl ied by mod els succ essful in explaining the pro c ess 
of isolated committees ( 1978,  p. 593 ). 
Maintaining our congressional focus, w e  now address s everal 
r elated ques tions :  Wha t are some al terna tive strategies exercis ed in 
committees? What ar e the nec essary conditions for th e exercis e  of 
foresight in uniquely beneficial ways? Finally, when and why do 
d iffer .ant strategies r esul t in differ en t  ou tcomes ?  Whil e  the 
questions ar e phrased somewha t  abstractly, th e underly ing motivation 
could hardly be mor e concr ete and is nicely summariz ed in exc erp ts 
from Manl ey's classic s tudy of W ilbur Mills and th e Ways and M eans 
Committee: 
"As I s ee it, " Mills has said ,  "our job is to work o ver a bill 
un til our technical s taff tells us it is r eady and un til I have 
r eason to bel ieve tha t  it is going to g et enough suppor t to pass . 
Many of our bills mus t  be brough t out und er a clos ed rul e, and to 
get and keep a clos ed rul e you must have a w id ely acc ep tabl e 
bill. I t's as simpl e as that. I t's a waste of tim e to 
bring o u t  a bill if you can't pass it. " ( p ,  448) 
And to ensur e passag e in th e House, Mills was acu tely attun ed to Hous e 
m embers' pref er ences. 
"H e counts the h eads in th e Committee and he counts th e h eads in 
concis ely ou tl ine th e probl em :  the House, h e's always coun ting . " ( p ,  446) 
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The revised theory incorporates the two key elements of strategy 
to which Manley allude s :  a willingness of committees to win, and their 
corresponding attentiveness to preferences of legislators outside of 
the committee. It does so , however, by building onto, rather than 
reconstructing ,  Shepsle's theory. 
Traditionally, theorists of voting discuss two strategies : 
sincere voti ng (sometimes called "naive" or "myopic ") and 
sophisticated voting (sometimes called "strategic ") . A voter who 
employs a sincere strategy when faced with two alternatives always 
votes for the alternative he prefers, even though its winning at the 
immediate stage of voting may in effect ensure its replacement by some 
inferior proposal at some subsequent stage . In contrast , the 
sophisticated voter votes for the alternative that he thinks will 
ul t imately lead to the selection of a preferable alternative. 
Sophisticated strategies therefore often prescribe ostensible 
misrepresentation of one 's preference at some stages of voting .  
Using the same rationale a s  that used in the conventional 
definitions of sophisticated voting, we shall define a new form of 
sophistication that is uniquely suited to simple institutional 
arrangements in which either the germaneness or the closed rule is in 
effect . Just as sophisticated voting in the conventional sense 
requires that voters are aware of how the outcome of immediate votes 
affects the choices available in subsequent stages, sophistication of 
committees requires foresight on the part of committee members. In 
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particular, we assume that members of a sophisticated commit tee ask : 
If we select a bill for referral to the floor, can it win, or how will 
it be amended? If the members judge that the bill cannot win or that 
it  will be amended in an unsatisfactory manner ( relative to other 
feasible alternatives, includi ng the status quo ) then the 
sophisticated committee may adopt another course of action or, 
possibly, inaction. 
The development of precise definitions of sophisticated commit tee 
behavior takes place in two stages. First , examples are studied and 
general definitions of situations that are "ripe " for sophisticated 
behavior are stated for germaneness and closed rules , Second, a 
single, complete definition of committee sophistication is stated in 
terms of the two definitions of ripeness.12 
Commit tee sophistication under the germaneness rule consists of 
knowing when to obstruct,  that is, to choose not to report a bill to 
the floor because of the expectation that it would be amended 
unacceptably . Reconsider the decision-making situation in figure 3 a .  
We know that under Shepsle's assumptions, which include Black's 
theorem applied within committee, the committee myopically reports its 
median motion, after which the amendment process on the floor causes 
the bill to converge to the floor median. With a modicum of 
foresight, however, the committee would choose not to report a bill at 
all . As a resul t,  s0 would remain in effect and a committee majority
would be more satisfied with the outcome. ( Note that the example is 
not as contrived as it  may appear. For example, even if the righ t -
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most committee and floor members were. interchanged, a majority on the 
committee would still prefer the status quo outcome under obstruction 
to the floor median outcome under referral.) 
If committee sophistication under the germaneness rule consists 
of knowing when to obstruct, then a precise specification of the 
conditions under which obstruction is favorable for a majority on the 
committee is a necessary step towards defining committee 
sophistication. Our study thus far has shown that the key points are 
FM, CM and s0• The key decision-maker is the committee median voter, 
who considers the relative distances between his ideal point, and FM 
and s0 -- distances which determine his preference between 
alternatives, In general, if the committee median voter prefers the 
initial status quo (S0) to the floor median voter's ideal point (FM) , 
the situation is ripe for obstruction, since only then does a majority 
of committee members prefer s0 to FM. Formally, 
Definition 4. A situation under the germaneness rule is r!2� fQf 
QQ§ifggt!2n if and only if lcM-s01 i ICM-FMI. 
Incorporation of foresight into the committee decision-making 
calculus can be beneficial in some closed rule situations, too, But 
sophistication under the closed rule involves not the binary choice of 
whether or not to obstruct, but instead the choice of where to place 
the bill. Although this form of sophistication is relatively 
complicated, the examples in figure 4 lead us to a general definition 
of situations that are ripe for strategic placement. Again, the 
relative locations of CM, FM and s0 determine the strategic 
possibilities. The exploratory procedure is to fix FM and s0 and to 
move CM from right to left, continually considering the strategic 
situation of the committee. 
[figure 41 
Whenever the status quo is in the middle position of the three 
key points, as in 4a, the committee position is hopeless and its 
actions, unless perverse, are inconsequential. For example, B CM 
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loses on the floor since a majority of voters are on or to the left of 
FM, which in turn is to the left of the sole alternative motion, s0• 
Such is the case even if the committee moderates its proposal, as with 
B'. In fact, the committee's bill can win only if placed to the left 
of s0, such as B". But the victory is hollow, since at least half of 
the committee members prefer no bill (S0) to B". Clearly, this 
situation is futile for the committee. 
In 4b, however, CM is between FM and s0, and the inability of 
floor members to amend the committee's bill is an obvious advantage 
for the committee, Since the floor median voter is on the far side of 
the bill (relative to s0) ,  a winning coalition for the bill over the 
status quo is guaranteed and the committee obtains its median outcome, 
The situation is similar in Figure 4c in which FM is in the middle, 
but because the floor median voter still prefers CM to s0, the 
committee is again in a favorable position. Indeed, the committee's 
situation is so favorable that it gets its median even without 
exercising foresight; even Shepsle's sincere committees would obtain 
committee median outcomes. 
Figure 4 
Convnittee Situations undtr the Closed Rule 
a. Futile 
B" B' B 
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Finally, i n  figure 4 d  the committee members can benefit from the 
judicious exercise of foresight and a willingness to jettison its 
median bill in favor of one that is strategically placed. A necessary 
condition is for FM to occupy the middle position, Given that, the 
sufficient condition is determined by the relative distances 
lcM-FMI and IFM-s01. If the former is greater than the latter, as in 
4d, then the committee can exploit the situation. We know that the 
committee loses if it reports its sincere bill, B = CM , since such a 
proposal is farther from the floor median voter's ideal point than is 
the status quo. A sophisticated committee, however, has the foresight 
to obviate such an outcome by moderating its bill so that the floor 
median voter barely prefers its strategically placed bill, B', to the 
status quo. Spatially, the bill should be slightly closer to FM than 
FM is to s0, Arithmetically, the bill is B' =FM - IFM-s01 + s, where 
s is a distance minimally detectable to the floor median voter, If B' 
were referred to the floor, it would secure the votes of a majority of 
voters, and the majority coalition in the committee would be more 
satisfied with this outcome than with s0• 
The discussion of figure 4 is condensed and generalized in three 
definitions, the last of which is the basis for the subsequent 
definition of committee sophistication. 
Definition 5. A committee's situation is futile under the closed 
rule if and only if 
a. CM > s0 L FM, or 
b. CM < s0 ! FM. 
(S0 is in the middle, ) 
Definition 6. A committee's situation is fsY2rsQ1� under the 
closed rule if and only if 
a. FM� CM� s0 or FM 2 CM 2 s0, or 
b. CM� FM< s0 and ICM-FMI < IFM-s01 ,  or 
c. CM 2 FM> s0 and ICM-FMI < IFM-s01 .  
(CM is in the middle, or FM is in the middle and nearer to CM 
than to s0.) 
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Definition 7 .  A situation is ri2� f2r §!rs!�gig 21scemgn! under 
the closed rule if and only if 
a. CM < FM < s0 or CM > FM > s0, and 
b. ICM-FMI 2. IFM-s01 
(FM is in the middle and is at least as far from CM as from s0.) 
Now, with reference to the definitions of ripeness under each 
rule, we define committee sophistication. 
Definition 8 .  A committ�� i§ §Q2histica!�g if it exploits ripe 
situations as follows: 
a. If the situation is ripe for obstruction (Definition 4 ) , it 
reports no bill. 
b. If the situation is ripe for strategic placement 
(Definition 7) , it reports: 
i. B = FM - IFM-S01 + e, if FM > CM, 1�nd ii. B =FM+ IFM-S01 - e, if FM < CM. 
IV. New SIAs with New SIE 
Having fully exposed the ingredients of preferences, 
institutional features, and strategies, we now explore the diversity 
and the relevance of the extended theory. Figure 5 highlights the 
extension from Shepsle's two institutional arrangements with sincere 
behavior, which differ only according to the rule governing the 
amendment process, to my four simple institutional arrangements which 
are determined by both rules and strategies. 
Our interest in committees as key institutional features in the 
congressional process suggests that we can roughly gauge the 
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usefulness of the theory by the ease and meaningfulness with which 
actual congressional committees can be assigned to one of the four 
cells. For example, which committees receive closed rules for their 
legislation? Which committees engage in sophisticated behavior? 
Although the figure contains some answers to these questions, the 
discussion of why certain committees were placed into certain cells is 
deferred until some loose ends of the extended theory are tied up. 
[figure 5] 
Recall that Shepsle restricted his focus to the top half of 
figure 5, and that his theorems on the existence of SIE pertained only 
to germaneness situations (SIA A) . Furthermore, we demonstrated that 
in closed rule settings with committee members who vote sincerely (SIA 
B) , SIE do not exist, in general. The natural follow-up is to assess 
the equilibrium properties of SIAs C and D to see whether the 
existence of SIE is attributable to rules only (e.g., SIE exist under 
the germaneness rule but not under the closed rule) or, perhaps, to 
some heretofore unspecified QQIDbins!iQn§ of rules and strategies. 
The procedure for determining whether SIE exist in settings in 
which committees are sophisticated is only slightly different from the 
earlier one. While the central thrust of Shepsle's definitions 
remains intact, the meaning of condition ( 2) in definitions 2 and 3 is 
different under the assumption of committee sophistication. Implicit 
in condition ( 2 )  is the committee's choice function, which tells which 
of any two points a committee chooses. In the context of the 
definition, one such point is s0• In Shepsle's institutional 
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arrangements , the commi ttee's choice i s  always d etermined exclusively 
by the pref er en ces of commi ttee members. When commi ttees are 
sophistica ted , however ,  the commi ttee's bill is not always the median, 
as commi ttee members' pref er ences alone di ctate. Rather , the choi ce 
is condi tioned also by noncommittee members' prefer ences , which 
d etermine wheth er a si tua tion is ripe, nonripe, futil e or favorable, 
and whi ch inform the commi ttee what will happen to various f easibl e 
bills on th e floor. The r evised choice function for the commi ttee is 
includ ed in d efini tion 8 ,  to whi ch we r ef er as we examine the 
equilibrium proper ti es of th e new SIAs , 
In SIA C ( g ermaneness rule, sophisti cated commi ttees ), the 
si tuation must of course be ripe or no t ripe, If it is no t ripe, 
commi ttee behavior is iden ti cal to tha t  in SIA A, in which Shepsl e 
proved the existence of SIE . Ther efor e we need to address only 
si tua tions tha t  are ripe for obstruction, su ch as figure 3 a ,  Since 
sophistica ted commi ttees obstruct in such si tuations, S is th e same as 
s0 and remains fi xed o ver time, But the question is not simply
whether it is durable bu t more importantly wheth er it is invulnerabl e 
in Shepsl e's sense, Th e answer is "yes" for th e simpl e reason tha t  
choice of some point o ver the sta tus quo by the committee i s  a 
necessary condi tion for vulnerability, Since a sophistica ted 
commi ttee never chooses any point o ver S in si tuations ripe for 
obstruction ( d efini tion Ba), the necessary condi tion for vulnerability 
is no t satisfied; S therefor e  is invulnerabl e and an SIE . More 
g enerally, type C SI As always have SIE . Consider ed jointly with 
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Shepsle 's result ,  then, this findi ng i ndicates that the abi lity of the 
germane ness rule to i nduce equilibrium is not str ategy-dependent; 
si ncere and sophisticated behavior alike result i n  SIE whe n the 
germane ness rule is in effect. 
Only one i nstituti onal arr angement remai ns :  c losed rule 
situati ons i n  which committees are sophisticated. O ne of three 
si tuati ons must exist:  futile, favor able, or ripe.  I n  futile 
si tuations, such as figure 4 a, the c ommittee senses i ts futi li ty, 
mi nimizes decisi on costs, and reports no bi ll. As i n  the germaneness 
si tuati on, then, c onditi on ( 2) c annot be satisfied and S is 
i nvu lne r ab le in c losed rule, futile situati ons . 14
In f avor able situati ons ( figures 4b and 4c ) ,  either s° CM t o
begin with or S = CM after one sessi on. I n  either c ase a 
sophisticated committee never reports a bi ll. So this S, t oo, fai ls 
condi ti on ( 2 )  for vulnerabi lity and is therefore an S I E. 
Fi nally, u nder ripe situati ons ( figure 4d ) ,  the str ategic ally 
p laced bi ll becomes the new status quo poi nt ,  S ,  after one sessi on, 
whereupon the situation changes from ripe to fut i le ,  Si nce w e  just 
showed th at the status quo poi nt in futile situati ons is an SI E, the 
demonstr ati on is complete. Thus, no matter what the i nitial situation 
-- futile ,  favor ab le or ripe -- after one and only one sessi on of 
decisi on-maki ng there exists a structure-i nduced equi librium i n  SIA D, 
as well as in SIAs A and C .  
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V. Implicati ons and Evidence 
Alth ough i ntuitive ly one might expect that i ncorporation of 
diverse strategies w ou ld u ndermine the predictability and s t ability of 
political outcomes, the the oretical analysis suggests the opposite. 
If anythi ng ,  outcomes u nder sophisticated behavi or ought to be more 
stable than outcomes u nder sincere behavi or .  But alas the time h as 
c ome to put some empirical meat on these the oretical b ones ,  
W e  lear n  from P olsby's study th at the contempor ary H ouse h as 
become "i nstituti onalized . " Bou nd aries are well defined, i n  part 
because tur nover h as decli ned and members' i ncentives t o  s t ay i n  the 
system have i ncreased. C oncomitant ly, the H ouse became i nter nally 
c omplex; c ommittees are no longer ad hoc t ools of the leadership but 
r ather are permane nt ,  i ncreasingly specialized units with fixed 
jurisdicti ons and membership determined primari ly by "au t omatic r ather 
th an discreti onary methods " ( p .  145 ) , A maj or effect of such change 
h as bee n t o  "facilitat[e] the growth of st able ways of d oi ng busi ness " 
(p.  153 ) ,  P olsby's reasoni ng ( not to mention his choice of w ords ) 
p aves the w ay for a practical response to my i ntroductory c all for 
theoretical relevance. Specifically, might there be a re lati onship 
between P olsby's "st ab le w ays of d oi ng busi ness" and Shepsle's and my 
stable out c omes , that is,  between observed real-wor ld 
i nstituti onalizati on and the oretical equilibria? If a c onnection does 
exist -- and i t  seems that all of us suspect that it  d oes,  th ough 
perhaps f or somewhat different reasons � the n how might the ory and 
d at a  be combined t o  support its existence? 
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Based on the fact that committees are the central components both 
of the institutionalized House and of SIAs, we seek an answer by 
ex amining the fit between committees in Congress and commit tees in 
simple institutional arrangements. To the degr ee that congressional 
committees belong to §i�Q!� institutional arrangements (that is, SIAs 
with S IE) , the hypothesis that institutionalization contributes to 
st able outcomes receives support . We therefore expect to see 
committees i n  cells with SIE (A, C, and D) but not in cells without 
SIE (B) . ( Or if there were committees in B, we would expect to see 
erratic outcomes on issues over which those committees have 
jurisdiction. )  
Fenno 's six committees comprise a readily available and well -
known sample for this exercise. Initially, we classify the committees 
as sophisticated or sincere according to the degree to which their 
members have reached a consensus on their decision rules. Fenno 
writes that decision rules differ widely but are nevertheless 
generalizable . 
Despite the uniqueness of each committee 's decision rules, two 
interesting patterns did emerge -- interesting bec ause both of 
them distinguish Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Interior on 
the one hand from Education and L abor , Foreign Affairs, and Post 
Office on the other. Each of the first three committees has 
achieved a consensus on its decision rules; e ach of the l at ter 
three committees has not.  Furthermore , the decision rules of the 
first three committees are all,  in one way or another, oriented 
toward insuring success on the House floor; the decision rules of 
the l at ter three are not (p. 8 0). 
The absence of a consensus on decision rules in the Education and 
L abor , Forei gn Affairs, and Post Office committees is evidence of 
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sincere beh avior by committees. Without the consensus, members of the 
committee are not likely to reco gnize and exploit ripe situations. 
They are too preoccupied with the "harsh rules of policy combat" ( p .  
1 2 7 )  in the committee st age to worry about whether,  o r  in what amended 
st ate,  their bills will pass on the floor. Fenno 's quo t ation and 
interpretation of a member of one such commit tee supports the 
characterization of these commit tees as str at e gically sincere. 
On Education and L abor , members normally fi ght about anything at 
any st age . In the words of one veteran, "You c an't get a 
resolution praising God through this committee without ge tting a 
three -d ay battle over i t . " As another senior member put it, 
"It 's a free -for-all;  every man for himself. " (p. 8 6) 
But in the Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Interior 
committees, the desire for success on the floor , and a recognition 
that success requires the exercise of a specific se t of decision rules 
in committee, are evidence of sophisticated committee behavior. If 
committee members want their committee's position to prevail on the 
floor, and know how to make it prevail, then they must possess the 
foresight characterist ic of sophisticated behavior. Thus Fenno writes 
that 
[a] set of decisions coming from an influence -seeking, House ­
oriented, corporate committee will be packaged for the floor more 
carefully than will a set of decisions emerging from a policy­
seeking non-House -oriented , individualistic committee (p. 240 ). 
These excerpts -- and the rich set of observations on which they 
are based � support the placement of Appropri ations, Ways and Means, 
and Interior committees in the lower, sophisticated portion of figure 
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S ,  while Education and Labor , Foreign Affairs, and Post Office clearly 
belong on top .  
Categ orization on the basis of rules i s  less clear-cut whereas 
Qyrg closed rules are rarely granted to legislation, 15 Recall ,
however , that a continuum underlies what i s  presented i n  figure S as a 
dichot omy. Thus to the extent that some committees are relatively 
likely to receive cl osed rules for their legislation -- as the Ways 
and Means Committee was when Fenno studied it ( bu t  see Rudder; 197 7 )  
- - or to the extent that committees tend t o  receive relatively cl osed 
rules ( rules that restrict the number of amendments or inhibit the 
offering of amendments) , the committees bel ong t owards the closed end 
of the c ontinuum. With this interpretation and further support from 
Fenno, we place Ways and Means in SIA D. 
More than any other commit tee , Ways and Means members see 
themselves as working fQr the House . "On our C ommitte e ,  we have 
a responsibility t o  the House ; we have to do the beat we can." 
The closed rule,  of course , provides str ong reinforcement for 
this percepti on .  If Commit tee bills are t o  be offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis, members must make certain that they 
are "taken "  without unnecessary misgivings ( p .  8 5 ) . 
Classification of the committees on Interior and Appropriations 
is confounded by the fact that neither commit tee regularly receives 
closed rules, Both , however,  are sufficiently cognizant of and 
responsive to preferences of n onc ommittee members tha t ,  in practice , 
their legislation is rarely amended successfully and significantly. 
Fenno wri tes that the Interior C ommittee "cultivates an image of 
routinized , expert deliberations" ( p .  63 ) and that the effect of its 
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image i s  t o  reduce controversies on the floor .  For example "in 196 5 ,  
Wayne Aspinall said that since he had become Chairman [ of Interi or ]  
( in 1959) he had 'only l ost two bills -- two inconsequential bills "' 
( p ,  260 ) , And in an earlier study of the Appropriations C ommittee , 
Fenno reported that abou t  90 percent of its d ollars and cents 
recommendati ons were accepted without change on the fl oor ( 1966 • p. 
450) , So there can be  little d oubt that these two committees belong 
in SIAa C Qr D .  Whether classificati on in D is more appropriate than 
in C remains an open question ,  depending on how one wishes to define 
rules. Strictly speaking , they are germaneneas rules; practically 
speaking ( for reasons the present the ory does not inc orporate ) ,  they 
are relatively closed. 
Fortunately , in neither case d oes this one small gray area 
undermine the two larger findings. First is the close c orresp ondence 
between Fenno'a permeable committees and my type A SIAa , and between 
his corporate c ommittees and my sophisticated SIAa ( types C and D ) . 
Second is the broader observati on that according t o  this sample of 
committees, the d ominant instituti onal arrangements in C ongress 
exhibit stable mi�g§ of institutional and strategic features. Three
of four SIAa yield structure-induced equil ibria , and no committee 
( neither in this sample nor in Congress itself ,  for that mat ter)  
belongs in the sole , potentially unpredictable SIA . 
To conclude we reconsider Shepsle's profound synopsis that 
II institutional arrangements • • •  conspire with the preferences 
of individuals to produce structure-induced equilibrium . "  N ow ,  in 
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light of our theoretical extension bolstered by Fenno 's and Polsby 's 
empirical insights,  the set of conspiring ingredients seems to be 
larger and the resu lting equilibria more pervasiv e .  N o t  just 
preferences and institutional arrangements,  but a lso §irstggig§,  
conspire to produce predictable and stable outcomes. Combined with 
the observed incidence of stable institutional arrangements in 
Congress , this revised synopsis should help to reduce skepticism about 
the empirical re levance of emerging forma l theories of legislatures. 
FOOTNOTES 
2 .  See Fiorina ( 1975) . 
3 .  See "House Bill Drops Ship-building Subsidies , "  Co.!Jgfg§§iong.J, 
.Q!!srigrlI_WggklI_figQQfi . October 2 ,  198 2 ,  p. 2443 . For other 
examples, see "Turf Fight Resul ts in Limited Highway Funds , "  
!big . , October 9 ,  198 2 ,  pp, 263 5-6 , and "Senate Eases Foreign 
Bribery Law ", Ng!!'_ York_ Ti!!!!!§• November 2 4 ,  198 1, p.  D l .  
4 ,  See "Interest Withholding Dispute Sta lls Senate Action , " 
Co.!Jgfg§§1Qngl_Q.\!�r1gr1I_Wegk1I_figQQrt,  March 12 , 198 3 ,  pp , 491-
94 . 
5 .  See Bach ( 198 1a ,  198 1b ) , 
6 .  Throughout the essay, we focus on unidimensional situations, 
Bear in mind , however , that many decisions can be made 
simultaneous ly in different commit tees and jurisdictions. 
Together with the specia l properties of SIAs,  this ensures that 
a ll results can be generalized to n dimensions. 
3 7  
7 .  Definition 3 i s  the negation o f  definition 2 .  Its form is 
somewhat different since the statements "- (p or q } " and "-p and 
-q" are logically equivalent, Thus vulnerability is R or RA ; 
invulnerability is - ( R  or RA } ,  which is equivalant to -R sDQ -RA. 
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8 ,  Shepsle does not use the term "replacement by amendment , "  but his 
verbal explanation of the second part of the definition of 
vulnerabi lity is consistent with the term . See p .  3 6 ,  
9 .  On p.  3 3 ,  Shepsle defines a proposal a s  a change in s0 • 
10,  More generally, any point in the closed interval comprising 
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amendment process, but i n  actual settings may reasonably expect 
it  not to converge entirely, since noncommittee members often 
defer to committees, In closed rule, futile situations, the 
committee does not report a bill ;  it knows the bill is doomed so 
chooses to reduce its workload. In closed rule, favorable 
situations, the commit tee reports no bill if CM = s0 and reports
region B is a replacement for s0, where the lower boundary of the CM otherwise. 
region is defined as the point at which the floor median voter is 
indifferent between that point and s0, 
1 1 .  The inclusion o f  sophisticated committees in Shepsle's theory 
appears to be an instance of independent and simultaneous 
discovery. See Krehbiel ( 1983 ) and Denzau and Mackay ( 19 83 ) . 
Denzau and Mackay a lso present an expected utility perspective on 
committee strategy. 
1 2 .  Throughout the discussion we assume that members' preference 
curves are not only single -peaked but a lso symmetric.  This 
assumption can be relaxed and the definitions can be generalized, 
but generalization requires more complicated notation and 
sacrifices the straightforward notion of preference as a function 
of policy distance , 
13 . For theoretical completeness (and out of practical interest )  we 
define committee sophistication in nonripe situations also, In 
nonripe situations under the germaneness rule, the committee 
reports CM ; it  knows the bill will converge to FM during the 
1 4 .  Alternatively, a definition o f  committee sophistication might 
state that the committee reports CM even though it knows it will 
lose. Condition ( 2 )  is then satisfied, but neither conditions 
( 3 )  nor ( 4) are .  There wou ld be no rep lacement because the House 
always chooses s0 over CM; nor could there be replacement by
amendment ,  since there can be no amendment. Thus with either 
definition, SIE exist in futile situations . 
1 5 ,  See, for example ,  Oleszek ( 1 984, p, 111) . 
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